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COMMENTS
The Pre-Pre-Trial Conference Without
the Judge in Federal District Courts
John M. Winters*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since their adoption in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have undergone several changes and will undoubtedly
undergo more as attempts are made to facilitate further the resolu-
tion of legal controversies.' Prior to the general adoption of any
new change, however, local rules of the individual Federal District
Courts may give to a new concept its initial trial. When any rule,
or group of similar rules, begins to appear in several District Court
Rules, it indicates that such a testing is taking place and a new
procedural device is either being accepted or rejected. One such
trend, if four isolated rules can be called a trend, is the use of a
mandatory conference between opposing counsel without the judge
prior to the pre-trial conference. It is this pre-pre-trial conference,
with its attending ramifications, which is the subject of this com-
ment. A brief historical development will be followed by a few
criticisms based upon the presently adopted Federal Rules and
a United States Supreme Court decision.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives to the
district courts the discretionary power to ".... direct the attorneys
to appear before it for a conference."2  These words indicate that
such conferences would be conducted before the judge, either in
court or in his chambers, and this seems to be the general rule.3
The advantage of the presence of the judge is in fact emphasized
by Nims when he notes the public stigma which attaches to any
* B.S. 1952, LL.B. 1957, Creighton University; C.P.A.; Member American
and Nebraska Bar Associations; presently Teaching-Research Associate,
University of Nebraska.
I For past and proposed changes see generally, Wright, Amendments to the
Federal Rules: The Function of a Continuing Rules Committee, 7 Vander-
bilt L. Rev. 521 (1954); Judge Charles E. Clark, Clarifying Amendments to
the Federal Rules, 14 Ohio St. L. Rev. 241; Armstrong, The Use of Pre-Trial
and Discovery Rules, 43 A.B.A.J. 693 (1957).
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
3See generally 53 Am. Jur.; Trial, § 11; 35 C.J.S., Federal Courts, §
136b(2); Nims, Pre-Trial, Chap. II; see also Judge John W. Delehant, The
Pre-Trial Conference in Practical Employment, 28 Neb. L. Rev. 1, at 18
(1948).
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display of friendship and cooperation between opposing counsel
unless the respected and impartial judge is present.4 As could be
expected, with over sixty Federal District Courts having promul-
gated local rules, and with almost fifty of these making at least
some reference to the pre-trial conference, the great majority con-
template that all required conferences will be in the presence of
the pre-trial judge. However, there are exceptions.5
II. THE FOUR RULES
As early as 1939,6 the Western and Eastern Districts of Arkan-
sas, after providing for pre-trial conferences upon request of coun-
sel, stated further that, "Attorneys are required to expedite trial
conferences by conference with other counsel in the case, and
entering into stipulations without the presence of the court, to
simplify and expedite trials and presentation of proof so far as
possible.' 7 Effective July 1, 1951, in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York was a rule requiring that the no-
tice of the pre-trial conference should inform the counsel of the ne-
cessity of preparing memorandums containing specified informa-
tion, and providing further that the "notice shall request the attor-
neys in preperation for the pre-trial conference to discuss with each
other the matters listed therein."8
4 Nims, Pre-Trial 196.
5 State courts have also adopted compulsory or voluntary pre-pre-trial
conferences. For example, the New Jersey Superior Court Civil Practice
Rule 4:29-3 provides that: "the attorneys shall confer before the date as-
signed for the pre-trial conference to reach agreement on as many matters
as possible. Each attorney shall prepare and submit to the court at the pre-
trial conference a memorandum statement of the matters agreed upon and
of the factual and legal contentions to be made on behalf of clients as
respects to issues remaining in dispute. . . ." The New Jersey Supreme
Court, on September 1, 1954, requested that this memorandum follow cer-
tain prescribed rules. 2 Waltzenger, New Jersey Practice Pocketpart 74
(Rev. ed. 1956). See also Note 10, infra.6 While 1939 is noted as the first year in which the federal rules made
mention of a pre-pre-trial conference without the presence of the judge, as
early as 1931, seven years before the adoption of the Federal Rules, the
Report of the Special Committee on the Jury System of the Nebraska State
Bar Association, after proposing the use of interrogatories, further proposed
"that counsel for both parties, thereupon, be required jointly to prepare
from the pleadings and the answers to interrogatories a statement of the
case which shall contain (a) A statement of admitted facts, (b) A statement
of controverted facts, (c) A statement of the law involved." 11 Neb. L. Bull.
36 (1931).
7 Ct. Rules, W. D. and E. D. Arkansas (1939), Rule 4, reinacted in sub-
stance in March 1949 as Rule 3, 2 Fed. R. Serv. 780.
8 Ct. Rules, S. D. New York (1951), Rule 15(b), 16 Fed. R. Serv. 904.
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In July of 1956, the Western District of Louisiana embodied
in its court rules detailed steps which necessitated counsel coopera-
tion at conference to be held prior to the pre-trial conference before
the judgeY The attorneys are required to exchange names and
addresses of witnesses, together with a short summary of the nature
of their expected testimony. Further exchanges include medical
reports, and all documents or exhibits, including photographs, maps,
or plats intended to be offered at trial. During this pre-pre-trial
conference, counsel must ascertain the admitted facts, non-contested
facts, and facts to be litigated, and file a memorandum of law con-
cerning any anticipated unusual legal questions. Finally the oppos-
ing counsel are required to execute jointly a "Pre-trial Stipulation"
embodying the results of these prior meetings.
As of April 1957, the Southern District of California ° effected
a rule providing that:
Not later than 40 days in advance of pre-trial conference, the
attorneys for the parties appearing in the case shall hold at least one
meeting at a mutually convenient time and place for the purpose of
formulating a proposed pre-trial order.... Each attorney shall then
exhibit to opposing counsel all documents ... intended to be offered
at the trial.., each photograph, map, drawing and the like shall bear
on the face or the reverse side thereof a concise legend stating the
relevant matters of fact as to what is claimed to be fairly depicted
thereby, and as of what date. Each attorney shall also make known
to opposing counsel his contentions regarding the applicable facts and
law."
Under section (j) of this rule, the plaintiff must then prepare
a pre-trial conference order for filing with the clerk, this order
to be "approved as to form and as to substance by the attorneys
for all parties appearing in the case ... "
III. GENERAL EVALUATION
An accurate evaluation of the pre-pre-trial conference will be
possible only after prolonged experience with the new procedures
9 Ct. Rules, W. D. Louisiana (1956), Instructions to Attorneys in Pre-trial
Proceedings, following Rule 13, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 931.
-o It is interesting to note that on September 9, 1956 the Judicial Council
of California amended its "Rules for the Superior Courts" (33 Cal.2d at p. 1)
in what would appear to be a forerunner to the adoption of the Southern
District of California Rules in 1957. Rule 8.2 of the "Rules of the Superior
Courts" provides that counsel "shall confer before the date assigned for this[pre-trial] conference to reach agreement on as many matters as possible.
They shall prepare jointly, or each shall prepare, and submit to the pre-trialjudge, at or before the conference, a written statement of the matters agreed
upon."
1 S. D. California Rule 9(d), 24 Fed. R. Serv. 914.
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established by these recent mandates. As with the pre-trial con-
ference, workability of the pre-pre-trial conference will depend
upon the proper education of the bar and bench to its methods and
upon a time of trial and error. However, a few comments might
be appropriate.
Insofar as the pre-trial conference is deemed advisable to elim-
inate some of the confusion and uncertainty at the trial,12 so too the
pre-pre-trial conference should tend to simplify13 the presentation
to the pre-trial judge. If the formula prescribed by these rules is
followed faithfully, many matters which the pre-trial order settles
can be disposed of without any cost of time or money to the court.
Presumably counsel, upon an early understanding of his opponent's
position, will be able to present his own case in a more intelligent
manner, more realistically discuss settlement,14 or more readily
recognize the inherent weakness in his own position. All of this
takes place with the possibility of the opposing attorneys being
more candid than when they are in the presence of the court or jury
12 See Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-trial Procedure, 36
Mich. L. Rev. 215, 21 J. of Am. Jud. Soc. 125 (1937); Judge John W. Delehant,
The Pre-trial Conference in Practical Employment, 28 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1948);
Dow, The Pre-trial Conference, 41 Ky. L. J. 363 (1952); and see generally
Nims, Pre-Trial.
13 Some will undoubtedly question whether the pre-pre-trial conference
does simplify the proceedings, especially in so far as the attorneys are con-
cerned. Judge John W. Delehant questions the practice of a judge who
requires counsel to submit pre-trial briefs upon the law and facts, noting
that such practice places a burden upon the counsel and the judge which
will rarely be adequately repaid (supra, note 12 at 18). By implication,
these comments could apply to the rules in question.
14Several comments about settlements are appropriate. Undoubtedly
settlements do occur in the vast majority of cases. This indicates that
counsel usually do confer and by and large can discuss the case on a
reasonable basis. Settlements are probably desirable as a more expeditious
means of settling legal controversies, especially in view of the crowded
dockets. In so far as some fear the pre-trial conference is being used by the
judge to force a particular settlement, the pre-pre-trial conference, being
without the judge, lacks this possibility. Also, where plaintiff's counsel may
think the defendant should broach the subject of settlement, while defendant
thinks it is plaintiff's duty, or where either or both think that bringing up
the subject of settlement indicates weakness, the pre-pre-trial conference
could resolve these difficulties by making a discussion of settlement manda-
tory and requiring the memorandum to state that settlement was discussed
but was impossible at the time. Note also how, by the end of this conference,
both counsel have a very adequate picture of the case and may best serve
their client by settling. On settlement at pre-trial see Nims, Pre-Trial, p. 62
et seq. See also Mott v. City of Flora, 7 Fed.R. Serv. 16.27, Case 1; 3 F.R.D.
232 (E.D. Ill. 1943).
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who may use frank disclosures to the detriment of the person mak-
ing them. This possibility of even greater candor is undoubtedly a
striking asset if, that is, the bar accepts the pre-pre-trial at face
value.
IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER FEDERAL RULES
Certain procedures attended to the use of the pre-pre-trial con-
ference as envisioned by the local rules mentioned above have a
close relationship with the present Federal Rules. Rule 26 (b) of
the Federal Rules provides for the disclosure of the names and lo-
cation of persons having knowledge of relevant facts and for infor-
mation as to the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any book, document, or other tangible thing of rele-
vant nature.15 The rule of the Western District of Louisiana,, re-
quiring the exchange of the names of all expected witnesses at the
trial, concerns the names of persons whose identity would often
already be known through Rule 26 (b) since such persons would
obviously have knowledge of relevant facts. However, there are
indications that Rule 26 (b) does not permit the discovery of which
persons will be used at trial.'7 One reason given for this is that
the decision to use a particular witness is part of the attorney's
work product. Another reason is that counsel are not able to so
limit themselves until they have completed the discovery process.
These arguments do not apply to the pre-pre-trial conference since
by this time discovery will be mostly completed and the final reso-
lution of the controversy begun.
Rule 34 provides for a compulsory inspection of all documents
and the like upon showing of cause.18 The local rule of the Southern
District of California requires the exhibition of all such items when
it is contemplated that such will be offered at trial. 9 While Rule
34 provides for this by motion, there is a requirement that there
be a showing of good cause. Conceivably the mere fact that the
displayed item will be offered into evidence at the trial is suffi-
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
16 Supra, note 7.
17 See 4 Moore's Federal Practice § 26.19, p. 1077 (1950) and cases cited
therein. The authors, however, disagree with the majority who would not
allow this practice. They cite cases holding both ways. See also 2 Barron
and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 650 (1950); and note 32 Neb.
495 (1953).
Is Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
19 Supra, note 11.
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cient to be considered as a showing of good cause. To this extent
then, this procedure is at least akin to the Federal Rules.
The pre-trial conference order, pre-trial stipulation or other
form of memorandum which results from the pre-pre-trial confer-
ence is to some degree merely the forced use of Federal Rule 3620
insofar as many of the inclusions would be the proper subject of
a request for admissions. But the memoranda would go further
in that the same matters enumerated in Federal Rule 1621 would
also be included, but the court would not as yet have added its
own approval.
It should be noted, however, that the pre-pre-trial conference,
despite its many close relationships with the other Federal Rules,
is in no way intended as a replacement for them. Its value as one
of the steps in solving legal controversies can be demonstrated by
putting it into the chronology of the steps to be taken. First, the
pleadings in concise, clear language take note of the existence of
a controversy, give general notice thereof to the court and the
parties, and place rather broad limitations upon the course of
future action.22 Next, through the use of the various discovery
techniques, 23 counsel ferret out all kinds of information from many
sources to determine everything which possibly could have even
a remote bearing upon the subject of the controversy.2 4 While coun-
sel at this time will know very much about the case and can thus
discuss it fairly intelligently, their knowledge will oftentimes be
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 which provides for admissions of facts and genuine-
ness of documents.
21 Rule 16 lists the following matters to be considered:
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which
will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for find-
ings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
22 1 Moore's Federal Practice, 438-451; 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 451.
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 to 37. See 2 Moore's Federal Practice 2441-2445; 2
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 641.
24 This assumes conscientious counsel and a sufficient amount involved to
warrant such procedures. Since this article concerns Federal courts only,
larger amounts will usually be involved.
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somewhat cumbersome and unwieldy.25 A conference before the
judge at this time would reflect this overly broad picture.
Logically then, a conference or series of conferences between
counsel could, with the interchanges contemplated by the local
rules in question, cut down and streamline the presentation to the
pre-trial judge. The judge, being thus better informed, can de-
termine the adequacy of the pre-pre-trial conference, take any
further steps he considers necessary to fulfill the present purposes
of a pre-trial conference, and add his sanction to a pre-trial order
which will then govern the course of the trial;26 a trial centered
upon actual controversies and resulting in a speedier, fairer, and
more economical trial. From this analysis it can be seen that some
of the functions of the pre-trial hearing are, if not eliminated, at
least somewhat modified. If the writings turned in under the rules
in question indicate counsel have in fact exhausted all possibilities
of facilitating the trial, the court can merely approve the confer-
ence results and set the case for trial. But even when this is not
possible, the court, being thus better informed, can center its atten-
tion on these matters which it feels should be dealt with further.
V. THE HICKMAN CASE
There still remains a serious question about some aspects of
these local rules. When the Louisiana rule 2 7 requires a restatement
of the witnesses' expected testimony, and when the Southern Cal-
ifornia rule28 requires a concise explanation of the facts depicted
by the documents, there may be an encroachment upon the work
product of the attorney. Hickman v. Taylor29 represents the leading
authority for restricting the discovery of witnesses' statements in-
25See Judge Alfred P. Murrah, Some Bugaboos in Pre-trial, 7 Van. L.
Rev. 603 (1954). Judge Murrah notes that ". . . even under fact pleadings,
much of the fatty tissue of a law suit survives the gamut of all recognized
formal preliminary motions, and that many times the real issue in a law
suit is reached only by the cumbersome method of trial and error, while
the jury sits in the jury box and busy litigants and witnesses restlessly
loaf in the corridors.. . . There can be no doubt of the utility of pre-trial
conference as a common sense devise for securing a just, speedy, and eco-
nomic disposition of litigation." Id. at 604.
2 6 Rule 16 provides that ". . . such order when entered controls the subse-
quent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest
injustice." Supra, note 2.
27 Supra, note 9.
28 Supra, note 11.
29 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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cluded in the attorneys' files.30 The vigorous disagreements during
the appeal of this case point up the controversial aspects of such
disclosures.31 The Supreme Court in the Hickman case held that
while the statements of witnesses and other memorandums, briefs,
communications and other writings prepared by counsel for his own
use in presenting his case are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege, they are nevertheless susceptible to discovery techniques
only upon a showing of special circumstances warranting this in-
vasion of the attorney's privacy. Justice Jackson in his concurring
opinion, in which he was joined by Justice Frankfurter, expressed
his almost violent opinions on the subject thusly:
I can conceive of no practice more demoralizing to the Bar than
to require a lawyer to write out and deliver to his adversary an ac-
count of what witnesses have told him.
While in the Hickman case the court was concerned primarily
with written statements already in the attorneys' files, it also con-
sidered the putting into writing of strictly oral statements. Its
arguments in regard to the latter are especially applicable in evalu-
ating the Louisiana Rule 32 in question. Few people can accurately
and concisely write down what they have heard from another.
The hearer's own prejudices, his pre-conceived ideas, and his own
desires as to what he wants to hear, may taint his account of what
he actually heard. The danger that inaccuracies will creep in may
cause an attorney to find himself, not an officer of the court, but
an ordinary witness in his own defense. In the case of hostile or
unwilling witnesses, an attorney who is forced against his will to
rely on such testimony will find it impossible as a practical matter
to foretell what such a witness will say. In fact, regardless of
what any witness has said in the past, it is often difficult to predict
what he will say in the future.
An application of the principles of the Hickman case to the
portion of the rule of the Southern District of California 33 requiring
inclusion in the documents of a concise explanation of the facts
30An excellent analysis of the many problems concerning the discovery
of the attorneys' work product in England, in the States and in the Federal
System both before and after Hickman can be found in 4 Moore's Federal
Practice, § 26.23 (2d ed.). For a list of cases following Hickman, see 5 F.R.D.
433, 459-60. See also 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 798.
31 See Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F.R.D. 403, where opposing
counsel in the Hickman case, as well as others, were given an opportunity
to air their views.
32 Supra, note 9.
33 Supra, note 11.
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depicted thereby is more difficult. There is no problem of inac-
curately restating anything; the attorney's own thoughts being the
subject of the statement. However, this use of an attorney's own
thoughts seems to be the underlying reason why the Hickman case
held as it did. Perhaps this is the "demoralizing" factor of which
Justice Jackson speaks. In the furtherance of justice, counsel should
not be able to hide from his opponent facts and witnesses pertinent
to the controversy, but on the other hand, unless there is a showing
of some special cause or circumstance, his analysis of these facts
and these witnesses' testimony is his own unless and until h
chooses to display his wares in the courtroom.
Because of the Hickman case, the provisions in these rules
should be limited to a requirement of disclosing the ultimate facts
and evidentiary facts about which each witness will be examined.
Similarly, comments about documents should be limited in the
same general way. This will give an opponent sufficient knowledge
to either seek contrary evidence, question the witness intelligently
himself, or in some cases recognize his own disadvantage.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the limitations imposed by the Hickman case, the local
District Court Rules considered in this comment are advisable
methods of further facilitating the processes of dispensing justice.
If over a period of time their use by the courts indicates that the
actual results are in fact those contemplated by this comment,
consideration should be given to their adoption as part of the
Federal Rules.32
34For an analysis of the practical problems concerning the use of the
Local Rule of the Southern District of California (supra, note 11) see the
recent publication, Seminar of Procedures Prior to Trial, 20 F.R.D. 485(1957). This seminar at the Annual Conference of the Ninth Circuit included
in its earlier portions some arguments for and against the pre-pre-trial con-ference from the practical viewpoints of practicing attorneys, judges and law
professors.
